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Abstract 
 
This paper examines FDI determinants in the BRICS and MINT throughout the conditional 
distributions of FDI for the period 2001-2011. An instrumental variable quantile regression 
estimation strategy is employed based on the intuition that, the determinants are contingent on 
initial or existing FDI levels. The following are some of the findings established. First, FDI 
benefits of GDP growth are more apparent in nations with higher initial levels of FDI. 
Second, real GDP output would more positively influence FDI in countries where initial 
levels of FDI are higher. Hence, the market-seeking purposes increases FDI with a larger 
magnitude in Higher FDI countries. Third, the impact of trade openness has a Kuznets shape 
for Gross FDI and increasing tendency for Net FDI. The impact of political stability is only 
significant for Gross FDI in increasing order.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Consistent with De Mello (1997) and Dupasquier & Osakwe (2006), capital control and trade 
restrictive policies were implemented in many developing counties in the 1970s and 1980s in 
an effort to protect domestic industries. The immediate effect of such poliies was  reduction in 
FDI, decreasing economic growth (Rodrik, 1998) and distortions in private and social returns 
(De Mello, 1997). These challenges led to economic reforms based on structural adjustement 
policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which entailed a mitigation of restrictions to trade 
and capital flows (Apkan et al., 2014; UNESCAP, 2000)
2
. Other developing countries 
confronted with an abundance of labour supply and shortage of finance also reduced 
restrictions to international trade and capital mobility (Asongu, 2013a, 2014a; UNCTAD
3
, 
2013).  
With the scramble for foreign land acquisitions (FLA) across the globe, a recent 
stream of literature on the determinants and implications of foreign direct investments (FDI) 
has emerged (Osabuohien, 2014, 2015; Asongu & Nguena, 2015). The rush in FLA/FDI is not 
only limited to developing countries in South & Central Asia, Latin America and Africa. It 
also extends to Australia, Russia and Ukraine. Notable foreign investors are of two kinds. On 
the one hand, we have private and public investors from Asia while on the other hand, a 
European private sector, consisting of hedge funds and investment banks are also playing a 
substantial role (UN, 2010).   
 A number of factors have been raised for FLA. According to Arezki et al. (2013), a 
debate underlying the rush draws on agricultural production structure that articulates the need 
for smallholder structure for poverty reduction initiatives (World Bank 2007; Lipton, 2009). 
This motivation is based on the exceptional poverty reduction experience by Asian nations, 
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which is substantially justified by burgeoning small scale agriculture (Loayza & Raddatz 
2010; De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2010).  In another line of narrative, global soaring food prices in 
2008 were met with limited flexibility in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of productivity 
improvement (Collier, 2008).  
  The beneficial effects of FDI are mutual to both domestic economies and investing 
companies. Potential benefits for the domestic countries include, inter alia: employment, 
finance and positive externalities (in terms of practice in corporate governance, managerial 
expertise and transfers of technology & skills).  In the same vein, the foreign company gains 
in terms of cheap labour, positive externalities from multilateral and bilateral policies of trade, 
access to market and natural resources (Akpan et al., 2014).  Consistent with the narrative, a 
report published by UNCTAD (2013) on World Investment suggest that FDI to developing 
countries has been increasing substantially, accounting for about 52% of total World FDI 
inflows in 2012. Among recipients, fast growing emerging nations like Brazil, India & China 
are among the 20 recipients. With respect to the spread in FDI relative to geographical 
regions
4
, the following received the highest FDI in their respective regions: Nigeria in Africa, 
China in East Asia, Mexico in Central America, India in Southern Asia, Indonesia in South-
Eastern Asia, Turkey in West Asia and Brazil in South America (World Bank, 2013). These 
countries represent the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa) and MINT 
(Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey).  
 As shown in Table 1 below, in 2011 the BRICS: accounted for 15% of global GDP, 
and attracted 26% of global FDI (Apkan et al., 2014; World Bank, 2013). It is interesting to 
note that there are common characteristics among MINT & BRICS countries. These include, 
inter alia: a positive demographic change skewed toward a growing youth population, good 
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geographic locations, the Great 20 (G20) member countries (with the exception of Nigeria) 
and favourable FDI policies. As shown in Table 1 below, between 2001 and 2012, FDI to the 
MINT and BRICS countries increased to 510.4 billion in 2012 from 113.6 billion in 2001. 
Within this period, the nine countries contributed 19% of global GDP, reflected 51% of the 
world population and accounted for 30% of global FDI (World Bank, 2013). Other stylized 
facts presented in Table 1 below demonstrate the growing importance of these countries.  
  
Table 1: Stylized facts on BRICS and MINT 
  
GDP 
(constant 
2005 
US$, 
billions) 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2005 
US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
growth 
(annual 
%) 
FDI net 
inflows 
(BoP, 
current 
US$, 
billions)* 
Population 
growth 
(annual %) 
Population, 
total, 
millions 
Natural 
resources, 
Share of 
GDP* 
Human 
Development 
Index (HDI) 
Brazil 1136.56 5721.23 0.87 0.00 71.54 0.87 198.66 5.72 0.73 
China 4522.14 3348.01 7.80 7.28 280.07 0.49 1350.70 9.09 0.70 
India 1368.76 1106.80 3.24 1.94 32.19 1.26 1236.69 7.36 0.55 
Indonesia 427.47 1731.59 6.23 4.91 19.24 1.25 246.86 10.00 0.63 
Mexico 997.10 8250.87 3.92 2.65 21.50 1.24 120.85 9.02 0.78 
Nigeria 177.67 1052.34 6.55 3.62 8.84 2.79 168.83 35.77 0.47 
Russia 980.91 6834.01 3.44 3.03 55.08 0.40 143.53 22.03 0.79 
South Africa 307.31 6003.46 2.55 1.34 5.89 1.18 51.19 10.64 0.63 
Turkey 628.43 8492.61 2.24 0.94 16.05 1.28 74.00 0.84 0.72 
*2011 data                   
 Source of data: UNDP (2013), World Bank (2013) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
Despite the growing relevance of MINT and BRICS in  shaping of the world economy 
on the one hand and determining the direction of FDI to developing countries on the oher 
hand, very few studies have examined factors that attract FDI to these countries. Vijayakumar 
et al. (2010) have assessed the determiannts of FDI in BRICS using panel data analysis for the 
period 1975-2007 and established that labour cost, market size, gross capital formation and 
infrastructure have positive impacts whereas the effects of inflation and trade openness are 
insignificant. Jadhav & Katti (2012) establish that: regulation quality , government 
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effectiveness (corruption-control, political instability and voice & accountability) have 
positive (negative) impacts on FDI. Using the same periodicity, Jadhav (2012) find that FDI is 
for the most part market-oriented because the availability of resources has a negative effect 
whereas openness to trade, rule of law and market size have the opposite impact. Akpan et al. 
(2014) which is closest to this study have used data for the period 2001-2011 to assess the 
effect in BRICS and MINT countries and concluded that while the effects of institutional 
quality and natural resources are insignificant, the impacts of trade openness, market size and 
infrastrucure have positive roles in determinig FDI. The above studies do not account for 
endogeneity. Moreover, the determinants are conditioned on the mean of the FDI distribution. 
 We complement the exisiting literature in a threefold manner. First, we investigate 
determinants of FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. The motivation for this 
line of empirical strategy is that even among fast growing developing economies, the 
determinants  may still  depend on initial or existing levels of FDI. We employ a Quantile 
Regression (QR) strategy for this purpose. Second, the issue of endogeneity is handled by 
instrumenting  the determinants with their first-lags. Third, like in Apkan et al. (2014), we 
complement BRICS with MINT countries.  
The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and 
empirical literature. The data and methodolodgy is covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents 
the empirical analysis and discussion of results. We concluded with Section 5.   
 
2. Theoretical and empirical evidence   
2.1 Theoretical highlights  
 Consistent with Apkan et al. (2014), the interest of multinational companies for 
investing abroad is based on a plethora of theoretical underpinnings that incorporated, inter 
alia: the neoclassical theory of trade, eclectic paradigm, market imperfections and product 
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lifecycle theory. The theoretical underpinnings substantially draw on a model from 
Heskscher-Ohlin which sustains that capital flows and opportunities of trade between two 
nations are relatively contingent on endowment in factors of production. In this light, 
investment from multinational companies take advantage of lower production cost and better 
return to investment opportunities. According to the theory of market imperfection, 
multinational companies can relocate production activities or locate to other nations (to gain 
from economies of scale, government incentives & ownership externalities) because of 
imperfect markets (Eiteman et al.,  2007;  Kindlerberger, 1969). Consistent with the theory on 
imperfections, market imperfections in the domestic economies motivate multinational 
corporations to engage in further processes  of enhancing their assets (Hennart, 1982; Buckley 
& Casson, 1976; Shapiro, 2006).  
2.2 Empirical evidence: determinants of FDI 
 An interesting empirical literature has documented FDI/FLA determinants. These 
factors according to Akpan et al. (2014) are contingent on: context of papers, variable 
measurement and periodicity of investigation (Buchanan et al., 2012; Ranjan & Agrawal, 
2011; Hajzler, 2014; Moosa & Cardak, 2006; Asiedu, 2006; Sekkat & Veganzones-
Varoudakis, 2007; Asiedu, 2002; Moosa, 2002). In accordance with Asongu & Nguena 
(2015), we present the existing empirical literature in six main strands, notably: business 
climate quality (return, institutions, trade and infrastructure), issues with security in tenure 
law, bad governance, resource-interests, regional features and global economic meltdowns.  
 Business climate factors in the first strand include: incentives and labour 
(Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Asongu, 2014b; Tuomi, 2011); trade, infrastructure and size of 
domestic market (Kinda, 2010; Bartels et al, 2009; Vijayakumar et al., 2010; Büthe & Milner, 
2008; Jadhav, 2012; Anyanwu, 2012; Darley, 2012; Akpan et al., 2014; Bartels et al., 2014); 
return to capital & infrastructural quality (Asiedu, 2002) and; time, market factors &local 
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partners (Amendolagine et al., 2013). Institutional factors entail: democracy (Asiedu & Lien, 
2011), economic governance (Jadhav & Katti, 2012), political stability (Busse & Hefeker, 
2007), the control of corruption (Wei, 2010; De Maria, 2010) and a general appealing 
institutional environment (Bartels et al., 2014; Hayakawa et al., 2013;  Abdioglu et al., 2013; 
Asongu, 2012;  Cleeve, 2012; Tuomi, 2011; Kinda, 2010; Neumayer & Spess,  2005; 
Gastanaga et al., 1998).  
 The element of business climate in the second strand has been substantially 
documented by Areski et al. (2013). Here narratives are conflicting because, while bad 
governance is found to be a pulling factor in certain cases, it is not the case for others. 
Moreover, whereas Kolstad & Wiig (2011) have established poor business climate conditions 
like bad governance as the principal factor determining the location of foreign Chinese 
investments in Africa, Asongu & Aminkeng (2013) have presented a more balanced narrative, 
citing that Western nations/corporations as much as China, are interested in doing business 
with any country as long as strategic interest is at play.  
 Concerns about tenure security which constitute the third stand have been documented 
in the interesting literature on FLA (Arezki et al., 2013; UN, 2010). Accordingly, the 
Economic Commission for Africa (2014), Ingwe et al. (2010) and Okoth-Ogendo, (2008) 
have identified the significant role of land tenure systems in food security. Wouterse et al. 
(2011) have most eloquently articulated the concern: “taken away the land of peasants which 
are possessed on communal tenure systems that starkly contrast with official land titles 
related to ‘indigenous colonialist’ controlled neoliberal capitalist systems, who have used 
various forms of manipulation in the past to alienate Africans from their land” (Asongu & 
Nguena, 2014, p.4). The position is confirmed by inter alia: German et al. (2011) who 
establish that FLA do not protect customary rights; Thaler (2013) on foreign investment 
strategically targeting countries with weak tenure laws; Liu (2013) on the substantial risk FLA 
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exert on the local population and Osabuohien (2014) concluding that FLA agreements are not 
influenced by local institutions because of very dictatorial State power.  
 In the fourth stream, we find resource-seeking interest as a fundamental driver of FDI 
(Lay & Nolte, 2014; Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013). Jadhav (2012) and Rogmans & 
Ebbers (2013) have shown that natural resources availability is negatively linked to FDI when 
protectionist policies are in domestic economies. This narrative is not mainstream because 
Lay & Nolte (2014) after extending the interesting literature by Arezki et al. (2013) confirm 
the positive drive of resource abundance in FDI location decisions. However, there is need for 
a more balanced debate over which countries are more resource-thirty. Asongu & Aminkeng 
(2013) have debunked the Kostad & Wiig (2011) perspective of a resource-hungry China by 
concluding that Western nations/corporations are also as much resource-hungry.  
 The fifth strand argues that global shocks such as financial and food crises are also 
playing a substantial role in driving FLA/FDI, especially for agricultural motives (Wouterse et 
al., 2011). According to the narrative, in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis, nations that 
substantially depended on the importation of food began purchasing land abroad to insure 
domestic security in food supply in event of future crisis. In essence, the 2008 crisis was 
fuelled by about 25 nations imposing restrictions to food exports. This motivated private 
sectors to begin engaging in speculative investments (Clapp, 2013; Isakson, 2013; Fairbairn, 
2013). Financial institutions concerned with this speculative investment and setting-up 
agricultural funds include: Deutsche Bank in Germany; Goldman Sachs & Black Rock in the 
USA and Knight Frank in the UK. Some other global dynamics advanced are growing trends 
of economic prosperity in emerging countries and evolving strategic relevance of biofuels 
(German et al., 2011).  
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The sixth strand highlights the importance of regional factors. Whereas Asiedu (2002) 
from a broad perspective has concluded that sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is less inclined to 
attract FDI due to her geographical location, Anyanwu (2012) has contradicted the findings 
by concluding from an African comparative analysis that the Eastern and Southern regions in 
the continent attract more FDI. Other regional factors favouring FDI/FLA in SSA include: 
well structured North-South FDI strategic agreements (Aleksynska & Havrylchyk, 2013), the 
comparative low usage of water supplies in the sub-continent which is currently around 2% 
(UN, 2010), strategies of non-interference by emerging nations like China (Yin & Vaschetto, 
2011) and presence of local partners from colonial heritage (Amendolagine et al., 2013).  
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
We investigate a panel of nine fast growing developing counties called the BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China & South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria & Turkey) for 
the period 2001-2011. Consistent with Apkan et al. (2014), two main dependent variables are 
employed, notably: Gross FDI and Net FDI. It should be noted that the choice of dependent 
variables by Apkan et al. (2014) is consistent with the underlying literature documenting the 
use of net FDI inflows (Jadhav, 2002), unidirectional inflow to domestic economies 
(Rogmans & Ebbers, 2013), ratio of net FDI flows as a % of GDP (Asiedu, 2002) or ratio of 
FDI inflows as a % of GDP (Suliman & Mollick, 2009). 
The FDI determiannts we retain which have been discussed in the above sections are 
consistent with UNCTAD’s FDI classification presented in Table 2 below. The explanatory 
variables retained include: infrastructure, inflation, private credit, trade openness, political 
stability, natural resources, GDP growth and real GDP. But for inflation, we expect the 
determinants to positively affect FDI. However, it should be noted that the potentially 
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negative incidence of inflation is contingent on the degree of inflation. Accordingly, low and 
stable inflation projects a positive economic outlook which is an incentive for FDI.  
Table 2: UNCTAD's Classification of FDI determinants 
Determining Variables  Examples 
Policy variables Tax policy, trade policy, privatization policy, 
macroeconomic policy 
Business variables Investment incentives 
Market-related economic determinants Market size, market growth, market structure 
Resource-related economic determinants Raw materials, labor cost, technology 
Efficiency-related economic determinants Transport and communication costs, labor 
productivity 
Source: UNCTAD (2002) and Akpan et al. (2014) 
 
Table 3 below presents the definitions and summary statistics of the variables that are 
obtained from the World Development Indicators and World Governance Indicators databases 
of the World Bank, consistent with Apkan et al. (2014). The summary statistics of the 
variables shows that they are quite comparable. From the variations, we can be confident 
reasonable estimated linkages would emerge.  
 
Table 3: Definition of variables and Summary Statistics  
Variable(s) Mean  S.D Min  Max Obs 
      
Net Foreign Direct Investment (NFDI) 28.979 46.359 -2.977 280.07 99 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 2.402 1.348 -1.855 6.136 99 
GDP Growth (GDPg) 5.351 3.789 -7.820 14.200 99 
Real GDP (constant of 2005 US billions) (log) 6.346 0.886 4.260 8.341 99 
Infrastructure (Number of mobile phones per 100 people) 52.433 39.220 0.210 179.31 99 
Bank Credit (on GDP) 85.019 63.492 4.909 201.58 99 
Natural resources (on GDP) 9.003 8.110 0.294 38.410 99 
Inflation (Consumer Price Index) 8.580 7.519 -0.765 54.400 99 
Trade Openness (Import + Exports on GDP) 0.514 0.128 0.225 0.856 99 
Political Stability -0.826 0.613 -2.193 0.286 99 
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
Consistent with the underlying literature on conditional determinants (Billger & Goel, 
2009; Asongu, 2013b), in order to determine  if existing levels in FDI affect the determinants 
of FDI in fast developing countries, we employ a quantile regression (QR) approach. It 
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consists of determinants of FDI differs throughout the conditional distributions of FDI 
(Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
Previous studies on determinants have reported estimated parameters at the conditional 
mean of FDI (Apkan et al., 2014). While mean efects are worthwhile in certain cases, we 
extend the underlying study by using QR. While Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumes that 
FDI and the error terms are distributed normally, the QR approach is not based on such an 
assumption of a normally distributed error term. Hence, the technique enables us to 
investigate the deteminants with particular emphasis on the best and worse candidates among  
fast growing developing economies. Accordingly, with QR, parameter estimates are presented 
at multiple points of the conditional distribution of FDI (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
This QR technique has been substantially employed in recent literature on conditional 
determinants (Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2014b; Billger & Goel, 2009). However, the 
common drawback among these applications is the issue of endogeneity. We account for it by 
employing an instrumental variable (IV) QR technique. Hence, the determinants are 
instrumented with their first lags. The fitted values are then used in the QR estimations as 
exogenous variables.  
  titijti xx ,1,,                                                                                                  (1) 
 
Where: tix ,  
 is a FDI determinant for country i
 
at period t ; is a constant and ti ,  the error 
term.  The instrumentation in Eq. (1) is based on first lags. The estimations processes are 
based on Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors.  
The  th quantile estimator of FDI is obtained by solving for the following optimization 
problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (2) 
   






 
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
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


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
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i
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i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
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)1(min
                                             (2)
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Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of FDI or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                           (3) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of FDI. For the model in Eq. (3), the dependent 
variable iy  is the FDI indicator while ix  contains a constant term, infrastructure, inflation, 
private credit, trade openness, political stability, natural resources, GDP growth and real 
GDP. For robustness purposes, we report the findings for Least Absolute Deviations (LAD) 
which should theoretically correspond to results of the 0.5
th
 quantile. 
 The specifications in Eq. (3) control for multicollinearity and overparameterization 
issues. Table 4 below has enabled us to control for these concerns. Accordingly, from a 
preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, the issues are not apparent among the 
instrumented independent variables.  
Table 4: Correlation matrix on the loadings (for FDI) 
           
           
IVInfra IVInfla IVCredit IVTrade IVPolS IVNres IVGDPg IVRGDP FDI NFDI  
1.000 -0.081 0.234 0.203 0.303 0.273 -0.216 0.193 0.134 0.157 IVInfra 
 1.000 0.010 -0.081 -0.268 0.077 -0.230 -0.343 -0.256 -0.303 IVInfla 
  1.000 -0.140 0.551 -0.490 0.019 0.139 -0.118 0.175 IVCredit 
   1.000 -0.344 0.336 0.263 -0.177 0.308 0.204 IVTrade 
    1.000 -0.240 -0.179 0.467 0.035 0.231 IVPolS 
     1.000 0.065 0.069 0.132 0.039 IVNres 
      1.000 0.224 0.357 0.416 IVGDPg 
       1.000 0.243 0.696 IVRGDP 
        1.000 0.448 FDI 
         1.000 NFDI 
           
IV: Instrumented Variable. Infra: Infrastructure. Infla: Inflation. Credit: Domestic Credit. PolS: Political Stability. Nres: Natural resources.  
FDIgdp: Gross FDI. NFDI: Net FDI.  GDPg: GDP growth rate. RGDP: Real GDP.  
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4. Empirical results  
 
Table 5 provides results in terms of OLS, LAD and QR estimates. OLS results present 
the baseline findings on mean impact which we compare with those of LAD and distinct 
quantiles in the conditional distributions of FDI. While Panel A shows findings based on 
Gross FDI, the corresponding results in Panel B are based on Net FDI. The estimations are 
based on robust standard errors.  When interpreting the signs and magnitudes of estimated 
coefficients, it is important to note that, lower quantiles of the FDI conditional distributions 
denote countries with lower initial levels of FDI.  
 The following findings are established. First, baseline OLS results are different in 
significance and magnitude across specifications. This justifies the employment of an 
estimation technique that assesses determinants throughout the conditional distributions of 
FDI. Second, the LAD findings are consistently the same as estimates at the 0.5th quantile. 
We deliberately used the GRETL software for LAD estimates and Stata for the QR to assess 
this consistency. Third, GDP increases FDI with the magnitude increasing in the Top 
quantiles. There is an increase from the 0.75
th
 to the 0.90
th
 quantile for Gross FDI and from 
the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantile for Net FDI. Fourth, Real GDP increases FDI in increasing 
(decreasing) magnitude for Net FDI (Gross FDI). While it decreases for Gross FDI from the 
0.10 to the 0.50
th
 quantile and increases from 0.10 to the 0.75 quantile in Panel B on Net FDI. 
Fifth, the negative effect of Natural resources and positive effect of Infrastructure are only 
significant in the 0.25
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles for Net FDI. Sixth, the effect of inflation is not 
significant across specification and dependent variables. This is consistent with Vijayakumar 
et al. (2010) on the BRICS. Seventh, the effect of domestic credit is unexpectedly negative on 
Gross FDI and insignificant on Net FDI. Eighth, the impact of trade openness: has a Kuznets 
shape from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantile for Gross FDI and increases for Net FDI. Ninth, 
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the impact of political stability is only significant for Gross FDI in increasing order (0.10
th
, 
0.25
th
 & 0.90
th
).  
Table 5: Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
        
 Panel A:  Gross FDI 
        
 OLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
        
Constant -0.804 -3.433 -3.189* -3.60*** -3.433* 1.227 1.452 
 (0.697) (0.167) (0.053) (0.001) (0.076) (0.514) (0.701) 
GDP growth  0.252*** 0.173 0.079 0.142** 0.173 0.335*** 0.374* 
 (0.000) (0.173) (0.250 (0.026) (0.130) (0.001) (0.081) 
Real GDP 0.174 0.531 0.667*** 0.618*** 0.531** -0.086 -0.062 
 (0.552) (0.129) (0.007) (0.000) (0.026) (0.704) (0.886) 
Nresources -0.026 -0.031 -0.005 -0.001 -0.031 -0.024 -0.032 
 (0.217) (0.312) (0.813) (0.919) (0.923) (0.334) (0.232) 
Infrastructure 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007 
 (0.064) (0.487) (0.688) (0.243) (0.550) (0.119) (0.317) 
Inflation -0.004 0.003 0.013 -0.006 0.003 -0.005 0.022 
 (0.858) (0.956) (0.637) (0.723) (0.923) (0.793) (0.441) 
Credit -0.006 -0.004 -0.007* -0.005** -0.004 -0.007** -0.010* 
 (0.065) (0.221) (0.074) (0.026) (0.218) (0.012) (0.055) 
Trade 3.049* 4.158** 1.626 3.026*** 4.158** 3.08** 3.657 
 (0.065) (0.029) (0.409) (0.002) (0.022) (0.048) (0.295) 
Political Stability 0.495 0.475 0.847** 0.923*** 0.475 0.508 0.979* 
 (0.126) (0.307) (0.048) (0.000) (0.301) (0.125) (0.084) 
        
R² 0.231 --- 0.315 0.285 0.189 0.188 0.267 
Fisher  4.353*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -128.93 -134.018 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
        
        
 Panel B: Net FDI 
        
 OLS LAD Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
        
Constant -325*** -180*** -133*** -123*** -180*** -297*** -335.97 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.541) 
GDP growth  4.812** 2.613 2.280** 1.411** 2.613** 7.177*** 6.933 
 (0.018) (0.232) (0.036) (0.014) (0.024) (0.006) (0.574) 
Real GDP 39.89*** 23.53*** 17.25*** 17.56*** 23.53*** 37.67*** 43.924 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.506) 
Nresources -0.643 -0.306 -0.156 -0.300* -0.306 -1.41*** -2.062 
 (0.299) (0.524) (0.599) (0.077) (0.324) (0.001) (0.491) 
Infrastructure 0.009 0.011 0.070 0.071*** 0.011 0.216** 0.155 
 (0.921) (0.908) (0.112) (0.009) (0.841) (0.042) (0.821) 
Inflation 0.082 -0.327 0.035 -0.076 -0.327 0.543 0.299 
 (0.699) (0.559) (0.942) (0.654) (0.313) (0.277) (0.947) 
Credit 0.067 0.007 -0.015 -0.031 0.007 -0.018 0.015 
 (0.546) (0.911) (0.729) (0.152) (0.853) (0.799) (0.981) 
Trade 135.02** 79.329** 43.85** 41.62*** 79.32*** 102.2*** 122.22 
 (0.011) (0.049) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.604) 
Political Stability -3.573 0.311 3.166 2.097 0.311 -3.313 -17.668 
 (0.751) (0.953) (0.448) (0.438) (0.941) (0.663) (0.768) 
        
R² 0.609 --- 0.277 0.316 0.352 0.434 0.527 
Fisher  18.38*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log-likelihood -429.21 -402.105 --- --- --- --- --- 
Observations  90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
        
***; **;*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Nresources: Natural Resources. Lower 
quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where FDI is least. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. LAD: Least Absolute Deviations. R² is Adjusted for 
OLS and Pseudo for QR (Quantile Regression). 
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5. Concluding implications  
 
Privatisation policies engaged by many developing countries have failed to deliver the 
much needed FDI (Rolfe & Woodward,  2004). The need for FDI has also been articulated in 
recent population development literature.  It has concluded that unemployment externalities 
arising from burgeoning population (especially in Africa) would only be handled by public 
investmetn unless efforts are initiated to attract alternative forms of investment.  
This paper has complemented the underlying literaure on FDI  in developing countries 
by assesing the determinants of FDI in nine fast growing developing countries, notably: the 
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China & South Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria 
& Turkey).  Two main contributions have been made to the underlying literature. First, we 
have investigated determinants of FDI throughout the conditional distributions of FDI. The 
motivation for this line of empirical strategy is that even among fast growing developing 
economies, the determinants of may still depend on intiial levels of FDI. We have employed a 
Quantile Regression (QR) strategy for this purpose. Second, the issue of endogeneity has been  
handled by instrumenting the determinants with their first-lags. We have had findings with 
interesting policy implications. 
First, the fact that OLS estimates are different in significance and magnitude across 
specifications has a number of interesting implications. It implies that factors that influence 
FDI in the fast growing developing economies differ with respect to initial levels of FDI. 
Accordingly, countries with high, low or medium initial levels in FDI respond differently to 
the underlying determinants of investments from multinational corporations. Hence, blanket 
FDI targeting policies may not be effective unless they are contingent on initial foreign 
investment levels and tailored differently across high-FDI and low-FDI fast growing 
developing economies. Overall, this justifies the underlying motivation of the present study, 
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which has steered clear of past studies by assessing determinants throughout the conditional 
distributions of FDI.  
 Second, we have established that GDP increases FDI with the magnitude increasing 
across specifications (Low quantiles  to Top quantiles). Accordingly, there is an increase from 
the 0.75
th
 to the 0.90
th
 quantile for Gross FDI and from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantile for Net 
FDI. This implies countries already experiencing higher levels of FDI would benefit more 
from the Growth effects of FDI compared to countries with lower initial levels of FDI. Hence, 
without distinguishing the type of FDI, there is evidence of a threshold effect from the 0.25
th
 
to the 0.90
th
 quantile. As a policy implication, the FDI benefits of growth are more apparent in 
higher FDI nations among fast growing economies. 
 Third, we have established that, while Real GDP increases Net FDI in increasing 
magnitude (0.10
th
 to 0.75
th
 quantile), it decreases Gross FDI in increasing magnitude (0.10
th
 to 
0.5
th
 quantile). Whereas the difference in increasing magnitude is about 20.42 (37.67-17.25), 
the variation in decreasing magnitude is 0.136 (0.667-0.531). Hence, the FDI threshold effect 
of GDP growth is broadly confirmed relative to Real GDP owing to variations in the direction 
of increasing positive versus increasing negative magnitude. This further implies, Output 
would more positively influence FDI in countries where initial levels of FDI are higher. Since 
market market-size is measured by real GDP (see Jadhav & Katti, 2012; Apkan et al., 2014), 
the market-seeking purposes increases FDI with a magnitude higher in countries with 
substantial initial levels of  FDI.  
 The selective negative effect of Natural resources and positive effect of Infrastructure 
in the 0.25
th
 and 0.75
th
 quantiles for Net FDI means that only a few countries in the MINT and 
BRICS have contributed to the results in the underlying literature. Accordingly, the 
insignificant effect of Natural resources and positive impact of Infrastructure from Apkan et 
al. (2014) who have used the same dependent variable is substantially driven by a few 
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countries in the bottom and top quantiles. The negative impact of Natural resources which is 
consistent with the findings of Jadhav (2012) on the BRICS suggest that this sub-sample may 
be driving the negative effect.  On the same vein, the positive impact of Infrastructure is in 
accordance with Vijayakumar et al. (2010).  
 The negative effect of domestic credit on Gross FDI implies, multinational companies 
are more induced to investing in fast emerging countries with domestic credit constraints. The 
impact of trade openness has a Kuznets shape from the 0.25
th
 to the 0.75
th
 quantile for Gross 
FDI and increasing for Net FDI. Hence, it could broadly be established that for the latter, the 
benefits of FDI from trade openness increases with higher initial levels of FDI.  
 There is a threshold effect from political stability for the 0.10
th
, 0.25
th
 & 0.90
th
 
quantile. As a policy implication the FDI benefits from political stability depend to some 
extend on existing levels of FDI. This substantially contrasts with the findings of Jadhav & 
Katti (2012) on the BRICS, in which political stability is a negatively insignificant driver of 
FDI.   
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